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Value creation and the companies’ value propositions have long been the centre of managers’ 
concerns. Although increasing work is done on creating value with the customer, value creation at 
the ecosystem level is less studied. This is particularly the case in innovation contexts. Through the 
study of two cases in strongly regulated business-to-business (B2B) markets, one on a public 
transports operator and one on a systems assembler in the aeronautic sector, we analyse how 
projects on radical innovations are efficient levers to investigate the mechanisms of value creation 
for several actors. We propose a model of these regulated B2B markets - complex value networks - 
and show how the value evaluation framework was changed by a business model innovation, 
evolving to take into account the value for several actors of the ecosystem. We furthermore describe 
how major innovation in product design challenges the existing regulations, allowing companies to 
propose or sustain innovative regulations, and changes relations in the value network, sustaining the 
emergence of new partnerships. 
 
Value creation in innovation ecosystems has been 
receiving increasing attention, and Ritala et al. (2013, 
p246), signalled “literature is currently lacking an 
integrated understanding on the mechanisms for value 
creation and capture in the innovation ecosystem context”. 
Adner (2006, p98) defines innovation ecosystems as the 
“collaborative arrangements through which firms combine 
their individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing 
solution”. Innovation ecosystems demand specific 
processes and methods, and are extremely complicated 
due to interactions between the different actors and 
processes (Adner and Kapoor, 2010). 
In some cases, these interdependences have been 
successfully used to create value for few actors at the 
ecosystem level, as in the case of multi-sided platform 
markets (e.g. Rochet and Tirole, 2006), where one class of 
customers is a tool for value creation for yet other 
customers. In multi-sided platform markets, companies 
create value for two or more actors (and they often get 
their revenues from two or more actors, too) to establish a 
viable business. In the case of newspapers for example, 
they need to attract both readers and advertisers, and a 
greater number of readers creates value for the advertisers 
(Hagiu and Wright, 2015). 
These approaches however have rarely focused on 
strongly regulated markets, where the products or the 
relationship between actors of the ecosystem are 
constrained by a set of regulation rules that could overlap 
(for instance, aeronautics probates concern airplane 
elements as well as pilots or airport infrastructures). Such 
markets are challenging for management research on 
collaborative innovation, since innovations are made more 
difficult by the density of regulations that are shared by 
several actors. We contribute to this research gap by 
exposing managerial characteristics of these specific 
markets that we entitle “complex value networks”. Our 
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research underlines how innovative product design can be 
used to re-craft the value chain and the regulations of a 
strongly regulated innovation ecosystem by integrating 
opportunities and needs of several actors in the 
ecosystem, going beyond the direct customer.  
Through the study of two empirical cases in business-
to-business (B2B) markets within public transportation 
and aeronautics, this paper proposes an analysis of how 
projects on radical innovations are efficient levers to 
investigate the mechanisms of value creation for several 
actors in an innovation ecosystem. We furthermore 
examine how they lead to three main breakthroughs in the 
dominant business model of an ecosystem and in it’s 
entire value network: the set of evaluation criteria for a 
product, the valuable relationships between actors in the 
ecosystem and regulations inside the markets. 
2. Defining complex value networks 
According to Normann and Ramirez (1993), strategy 
has for a long time been placed in literature as the art of 
correctly positioning a firm in the value chain. The 
concept of value chain was introduced in the 1980’s by 
Michael Porter (1985), and has since been widely used as 
a tool to analyze value creation at the firm level (Fjeldstad 
and Ketels, 2006). It is used to describe the series of 
activities operated by manufacturing firms, which create 
value for their customers by transforming inputs into 
products. While the value chain is used as a tool to 
analyze value creation, business models articulate how 
value is created for users by an offer based on a certain 
technology (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). Demil 
and Lecocq (2010) add that the business model explains 
how value is created for two actors, the customer and the 
firm.  
But the value chain approach seems less and less 
adapted to describe value creation and strategic 
positioning, especially in sectors where products and 
services are more and more dematerialized and in certain 
areas of the public sector (Peppard and Rylander, 2006). 
One of the options to value chain introduced in literature 
is the concept of value networks, where the value creation 
addresses a network of numerous customers who benefit 
of their interdependence (Stabell and Fjelstadt, 1998). The 
concept has been discussed by scholars in link with the 
service-dominant logic and the value co-creation literature 
(Lusch et al., 2010), and has been applied to 
telecommunications, e-business, insurances, and supply 
management, amongst others (Fjeldstad and Ketels, 
2006). Value networks are considered more adapted to 
describe some industries, because instead of following a 
linear activity logic where each activity adds value as seen 
in value chains, value networks allow connecting multiple 
buyers and sellers at a single node (Funk, 2009). 
Furthermore, Funk (2009) draws attention to the fact that 
the relationships in value networks are harder to model 
than those in value chains. Instead of having a buyer/seller 
logic and each actor adding value through his activities, as 
in value chains, value networks describe value creation as 
the result of interactions between different actors. These 
interactions do not have to be only a circulation of goods, 
services and revenues, but can also be linked to the 
circulation of knowledge and intangible benefits, which 
can be brand recognition, information or loyalty (Zhang et 
al., 2014).  
To describe value creation at the ecosystem level in 
strongly regulated markets, the concept of value networks 
appears relevant because it does not only focus on how a 
firm creates value for its customers, but on the entire 
value-creating system. One firm’s business model is 
therefore insufficient to describe the entire value-creating 
process; we have to look into the entire ecosystem and 
how all the actors (suppliers, business partners, allies, 
competitors, prescribers and customers) interact to create 
value. Therefore an important organizational element of 
the value network structure is the rules that govern 
participation in the network (Kogut, 2000). This does not 
exclude the fact that in value networks new business 
models can emerge, but as described by Peppard and 
Rylander (2006) in their work on network value analysis, 
the business model is just a part of the issue of creating 
value in a network. The comprehensive description of 
where value lies in a network demands to take into 
account all stakeholders of value creation in the meaning 
of stakeholders from Freeman (1994), i.e. all actors that 
influence or are affected by the value creation and 
identifying the value for all participants. 
According to Gebauer et al. (2012), value is always 
created by at least two actors, for example a supplier and a 
buyer. Therefore, they defend all contexts have value 
networks: value chains as seen in manufacturing are 
simple value networks for them.  
Gebauer et al. (2012) apply the concept of value 
networks to public transport services, and state that the 
value network in this context is not as simple as in cases 
where there is only a supplier and a buyer. Their research 
highlights the importance of other actors in public 
transport that help co-create value. Based on their work, 
we propose therefore to introduce the notion of complex 
value networks, which will refer to the networks in 
which there are numerous actors involved in value 
creation, and where value creation cannot be described in 
a linear way, like in manufacturing value chains. Due to 
the introduction of several actors for whom value is 
created through the network of multiple buyers/sellers, 
like in the case of multi-sided platforms, the cost and the 
price for a certain product are dissociated. This separation 
happens because the different actors are linked and might 
be willing to cover costs of producing a product for 
another actor because that creates value for them. In such 
context, the business model approach, which focuses on 
value creation for the customer, is uneasy to apply to 
analyze the value creation process at the ecosystem level 
because the dissociation between cost and price induces 
interdependencies among actors. Furthermore, some 
stakeholders of value creation in complex value network 
lead activities exogenous to buyers/sellers business 
interactions, but which support or reduce the value 
creation at the ecosystem level. Thus, we will find key 
influencers or prescribers in complex value chains, which 
are highly relevant for value creation. As stated by the 
study on the mobile phone industry done by Funk (2009), 
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policy makers need to be involved in the value creation 
issues and in value evaluation, because they influence the 
standards put in place, which in return impact the 
potential of value creation for business players.  
In the case of a stabilized complex value network, 
value creation at the ecosystem level could be analyzed 
through a dominant design model approach (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978). But in the context of innovation, value 
creation analysis and building is an effective research 
question (Lee et al., 1995). As stated by Midler and 
Beaune (2010), breaking the dominant design renews the 
customer practices and values, as well as the ecosystem 
and its perimeter. They show on the example of the 
electrical vehicle that there are difficulties in addressing 
value creation in innovative projects. The question is 
especially understudied in networks and standard-based 
ecosystems (Gallagher & Park, 2002; Soh, 2010) to which 
our research aims to contribute. Beyond a tool for 
analyzing value creation, we propose to investigate 
through two case studies the managerial patterns of value 
creation from innovation in complex value networks.  
 
Table 1 concludes this section summarizing the main 
differences between simple and complex value networks 
from literature analysis. 
 Table 1. Comparison between simple and complex value networks. 
 Simple value network Complex value network 
Main actors - Unique Buyer/Final 
user 
- Unique 
Producer/Seller 
- Interdependent Final 
users 
- Multiple Buyers 
- Interdependent 
Producers/Sellers  
- Prescribers 
Direct price-
cost link for 
users 
Yes No, products and services 
often partially or 
completely paid for / by 
other actors of the 
ecosystem 
Value creation 
analysis 
Business model and 
value chain 
positioning 
In stable ecosystems: 
dominant design 
In emergent ecosystems or 
in case of innovation: ? 
Example White goods Public transport 
3. Materials and methods 
Our research relies on the analysis of two case studies 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) that highlight contrasted 
experiences of value creation for multiple stakeholders in 
complex value networks.  
The first case concerns a public transport operator 
(PTO), whose main customer is a transport authority, 
contracting public transport for the final users. From a 
business model approach of the PTO, it is a classical 
business-to-administration-to-user configuration (Malaval 
and Bénaroya, 2013) but if we consider all actors involved 
in or impacted by the value creation, the numbers of 
stakeholders exploded. We identified politicians and 
governments, users associations, other operators, 
infrastructure builders and manufacturers, employers, 
urban planners, policy makers, residents, rolling stock 
manufacturers and maintainers. A schematic overview of 
the complex value network in the transport ecosystem can 
be found in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Public transport ecosystem 
 
The second case concerns an aeronautics supplier 
working in the extremely regulated B2B market of 
aeronautics and who is very distant from the final user in 
the value chain (B2B2B2C). The studied firms sells pre-
assembled systems (like the cockpit, which we will focus 
on in our case) to plane assemblers. The ecosystem in 
which the firm evolves therefore contains parts 
manufacturers and plane assemblers. But besides them it 
is also composed of other system assemblers, who have to 
work following standards to make the plane assembly 
possible, as described in other industries relying on 
modularity by Baldwin and Clark (2006). Standards are 
deeply influenced by the certification and regulation 
agencies, which also regulate airlines and pilots. Airlines 
and pilots are also part of the ecosystem, since they are 
the buyer and final user of the planes, but the airline’s 
passengers also have to be taken into account. The 
ecosystem is illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. Aeronautics ecosystem in which the studied firm is placed. 
Adapted from Fricker and Mouldi (2014). 
 
Through an intervention research method (Radaelli et 
al, 2012; David and Hatchuel, 2008), the authors assisted 
these two companies in the exploration of value creation 
at the ecosystem level, which was needed to put in place a 
low cost strategy. In particular, we analysed how the 
public transport operator used low cost product design to 
involve ecosystem players in a value creation exploration, 
despite the fact that they used to associate low cost to a 
degraded service for the final users. The aeronautics 
company also wanted to innovate in one of their products 
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by proposing a low cost version. Although they were 
confident in their customer’s interest for that kind of 
product, they were faced to a major challenge, to get their 
product certified. This was central since regulations made 
it impossible for their customers to buy non-certified 
products. 
In the first case, the authors were involved in 
longitudinal collaborative research (Coughlan & Coghlan, 
2002) with a public transport company, and one of the 
author as executive PhD student (Hay, 2004) led an 
intervention research (Radaelli et al., 2012): she actively 
participated in the strategy developed during two and a 
half years. In the second case, two of the authors led a 
collaborative research during one year with two 
practitioners in charge of developing a low cost strategy 
for one of the firm’s product. 
4. The public transport operator case 
The PTO in we studied launched a research project on low 
cost in the beginning of 2012. The goal of the research 
project was to find innovative solutions to reduce costs. 
This was mainly motivated by an increasing challenge to 
reduce costs through operational effectiveness projects 
and a desire to expand the firm’s activity beyond its 
historical market. 
Part of this research programme, aimed to explore 
disruptive strategies for public transportation and 
practitioners, used in collaboration with the authors an 
oriented creativity method called KCP, for knowledge, 
concept and project (Elmquist & Segrestin, 2009; 
Hatchuel, Le Masson, & Weil, 2009). The main outcomes 
of this method for the PTO were a structured low cost 
innovation strategy, and a coherent bundle of research 
projects around proposed innovations. Some of the 
proposed innovations were radical and challenged the 
dominant design of public transport. They followed a 
smart low cost design strategy (Klasing Chen, 2013), 
which mainly consisted of radically reducing costs and 
creating more value for the client by starting a design 
from scratch of a solution to an identified need.  
These propositions however, made clear that in the 
case of a complex value network like public transport, 
value creation for the final user, as done in simple value 
networks, was not enough. There was a need to consider 
other actors in the value chain, the buyer for one, as well 
as important influencers of the ecosystem.  
Rendering the actors of public transport explicit was 
the first step toward the value creation for the entire 
ecosystem. It allowed identifying other actors inside the 
transport system besides the supplier (the transport 
operator), the buyer (the transport authority) and the user 
(the passenger), like politicians, user associations, 
infrastructure, etc... We then proceeded to identifying how 
transport already created value for all these actors. This 
allowed us to evaluate who were possible influencers, and 
also who would be affected by the introduction of 
breakthroughs in the dominant design.  
One of the proposed innovations, for example, 
proposed the replacement of the physical infrastructure 
through a virtual one. The value network around 
infrastructure is completely changed by this shift: the 
infrastructure builders can be excluded of the new value 
network, while app developers and other smartphone 
platform actors must be included. This kind of offer 
mostly faces violent reactions from the affected actors. 
They often do their best to avoid being excluded, and are 
often successful in convincing the other actors that 
changes would be harmful.  
Another example was a business model innovation, 
based on crowd funding and crowdsourcing. It clearly 
allowed value creation for the classical actors: the user, 
the transport authority and the transport operator. It also 
allowed the integration of additional actors in the value 
chain, in charge of putting in place and organizing these 
platforms. However, as can easily be seen in other 
crowdsourcing activities, the classical actors could easily 
have been excluded, if the initiative came from outside the 
PTO. The study of these possibilities clearly shows the 
interest incumbent actors have in working on these 
solutions. By opposition to the previous example, in this 
situation, they adopted a position that allows them to 
continue being a part of the value chain, as well as to 
create new partnerships.  
In the case of public transport offers proposed inside 
RATP, adding functions was part of most of the initiatives 
proposed in the smart low cost design approach. The 
functions added covered a wide range and were destined 
to different actors, going from functions for the user, like 
proposing to book your seat inside the transport, to 
functions for the competition, like a coordination of all 
transport modes. Each one of the added functions 
represented additional costs, and some were evaluated as 
having little chance of being accepted on their own. The 
reason for this was that they failed to create value for 
more than one actor. Combining these new functions 
often resulted in products that increased the number of 
beneficiaries of the innovative design activity, making 
them much easier to be accepted. 
Our case study inside the PTO also highlighted several 
interactions within the transport ecosystem. In the 
innovations proposed inside the PTO, we often realized 
the ecosystem was not adapted for their development. But 
instead of stating that innovations were not feasible due to 
an unfavourable ecosystem, an effort was made by the 
research program participants to push innovations in the 
ecosystem and to overcome difficulties. The work on low 
cost products actually provided the operator with some of 
the lacking arguments to discuss changes in the ecosystem 
with other actors. It furthermore provided an occasion to 
compare the ecosystem in which the PTO was with other 
ecosystems, as low cost airlines or frugal health devices 
and this benchmark helped to show which aspects where 
really barriers linked to the ecosystem, and which were 
rigidities linked to the company.  
We identified two aspects in which adaptation of the 
ecosystem played a determinant role to the successful 
development of low cost offers: infrastructure and 
contracts and regulations design. In many cases designing 
an infrastructure is part of the assignments of the transport 
planner, and the transport operator is picked once the 
infrastructure already exists. This is often justified by the 
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calls for tenders, which might be biased if one of the 
operators participated in the infrastructure design. But it is 
sometimes also linked to the lifecycle of infrastructure, 
which is very long when compared to the shorter cycles 
for which transport operators receive a contract through 
calls for tenders.  
Our work inside the PTO on a smart low cost design of 
an entire transport system showed that many potential cost 
reductions could only be achieved by rethinking 
infrastructure in a direct link to operations. As was 
observed with low cost airlines and airports, having an 
infrastructure designed especially for the low cost 
operation allows positive feedback, adding value both for 
the airports and the airlines. The same can be observed in 
the case of low cost transport. Not carrying unnecessary 
elements inherited from classical operations reduces 
infrastructure and operating costs.  
When looking at existing contracts and regulations 
around the PTO, a service contract exists between the 
user, the transport operator and the transport authority. A 
second contract exists between the transport operator and 
the transport authority. The main rights of the user and his 
main obligations are recalled in the contract, and they 
include but are not limited to the obligation to have a 
valid transport ticket, to validate it when entering public 
transport and to produce it on demand; to respect the 
premises and not litter them; and to respect the security 
rules.  
This contract is only possible in this format because of 
the existence of the contract with the transport authority 
and of the orders and decrees’, stipulating what is 
expected of passengers and of the transport operator. In 
the service contract with the user as it exists nowadays, 
there are no penalties for train delays, nor for service 
interruptions. These are all handled in the contract 
between the public authority and the transport operator. If 
the operator wants to avoid being regulated by the 
transport authority, it normally has to propose a service 
that would not be part of its public transport mission. Not 
operating a public service would free the transport 
operator of a series of constraints. 
However, to operate a service that would not be part of 
its public transport mission regulated by a transport 
authority, the operator would need to create new service 
contract with the user. Being able to create a different user 
contract also means being able to change the relationship 
with the user. Transferring a part of the activity to final 
users could be part of this new contract. One of the 
aspects the transport operator has to work on to develop 
its low cost strategy is on the arguments to make the new 
contract attractive for the user and its current customers.  
Findings from this case study are summarized in table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Findings from the PTO case study. 
Identified constraint Findings from the PTO case study 
Value creation Value creation needs to go beyond value 
for the final user, but there is a need to 
create value for the entire ecosystem. It 
depends on understanding collective rules 
and governance mechanisms.  
Breakthroughs in the 
dominant design 
Breakthroughs bring about changes in the 
value network, which can be taken into 
account through generic value creation. 
Firms should be proactive in working on 
breakthroughs to avoid being excluded of 
the new networks. 
Organization to create 
value in complex value 
networks 
Need to collaborate with other actors in 
the value chain to achieve higher value 
creation. 
5. The aeronautics case  
This case is based on the work done with industrial 
partners inside a group that builds electrical systems for 
the aerospace markets, on the design of a low cost 
cockpit. From a business model perspective, the firm 
seems to be in classic scheme of BtoBtoBtoX: they sell 
theirs parts to an assembler, who sells the plane to airlines 
that finally sell tickets to passengers.  In practice, as the 
company is a cockpit provider, the final user for them are 
the pilots, who do not paid the supplier for the designed 
services. Moreover, the value network inside which the 
industrial partner was situated is well-known to be 
extremely complex, including several different 
manufacturers (engine manufactures, airframes 
manufacturers, component manufacturers), the 
assemblers, airlines, pilots and regulators.  
In this context, the firm started a research project on 
the development of a low cost cockpit. The research 
included an analysis of all the certification demands, like 
the temperatures the cockpit had to be resistant to, and the 
comparison to what was provided today by the company; 
as well as an analysis of the standards in place. The goal 
of this analysis was to identify potential cost reductions 
by identifying aspects on which the company’s product 
might be delivering more than the customer valued. 
Furthermore, the company conducted a reflexion on who 
were the actors affected by changes in their products, and 
how they should be integrated in the design. This was to 
make sure the new product could be accepted and 
integrated into the system.  
One of the proposed solutions was to use a tablet-like 
object to replace the cockpit. Many pilots do indeed 
already rely on tablets as auxiliary objects to plan their 
flights, and consider them very handy. However, this 
innovation was quickly considered as not adapted to the 
regulations in place. Due to safety reasons, every part of 
the plane needs to be certified. And to attain the high 
safety performance airplanes have nowadays, the 
certification process slowly integrated a certain number of 
standards and aspects of the dominant design, like the 
technology used, that make breakthrough innovations 
systematically appear as impossible to be certified. In the 
case of the tablet-like object, the temperature constraint 
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for example demanded important changes to the existing 
objects. And applying the other constraints seen in 
regulation, amongst them the test flight hours the object 
has to have before being certifiable, quickly increased 
costs.  
The result of the exploration of this solution and of 
other paths identified during the research project was that 
to overcome this difficulty a certification innovation space 
should be opened. This space would assemble all the 
actors of the value network, and allow to discuss and to 
recreate a new certification, that would not make 
breakthroughs of the dominant design impossible to be 
certified. The actors of the value network have to be 
convinced of the importance of this space. This will only 
be possible if the new certification space and the products 
it will allow to certificate can actually create value for the 
entire ecosystem.  
A further possible approach to complex value networks 
and strong regulations was proposed to launch the low 
cost cockpit. It was to launch it as a non-certified object 
sold directly to pilots, clearly classified in some other 
category than a cockpit. That meant excluding the buyer 
who used to decide on the service and pay for it and offer 
the services directly to the final user. This is rather 
challenging, since it means excluding the firm’s main 
buyer of the value network, and represents certain risks. 
But several examples exist, although many of them are 
part of informal economies. That is the case of carpooling 
services like Uber, or of private waste collection schemes, 
like those organized by recycling companies. We can also 
cite the Grameen Veolia initiative (Yunus et al., 2010), 
where water is directly sold to the population through 
prepaid cards, with a business model that resembles more 
to the bottled water business model than to the one seen in 
European water supply. Findings from this case study are 
summarized in table 3. 
Table 3. Findings from the aeronautics case study. 
Identified 
constraints 
Findings from the aeronautics case study 
Value creation Standards and regulations can demand to find new 
ways to create value, including changes in the 
actors of the value network and creating new value 
networks  
Breakthroughs 
in the 
dominant 
design 
Breakthroughs in the dominant design can be the 
catalysts for radical changes of the ecosystem 
Organization 
to create value 
in complex 
value 
networks 
The existence of standards makes collaboration 
inside the ecosystem essential to propose 
breakthroughs. One actor cannot create new 
standards and regulations on his own. 
6. Main results 
From the case-studies analyses, we identify two different 
levels of interaction with the ecosystem that allowed us to 
develop our model of complex value networks. The first 
consists in creating innovations that integrate all the 
actor’s value evaluations, while the second level consists 
of changing the ecosystem by changing the product and 
therefore regulations and interactions in the ecosystem.  
6.1 Creating value for all actors in the 
ecosystem 
Our first result therefore is that the business model 
innovations in these complex value chains allowed 
highlighting specific managerial patterns to involve and 
renew the value evaluation framework of other actors than 
the firm’s customer. The value evaluation frameworks of 
different actors of the ecosystem were different, and often 
contradicting. That was namely the case for the PTO, 
where value for the public authority was, amongst others, 
measured by the number of passengers transported for a 
given cost. In opposition to that, value for the final user 
was measured by being comfortably transported, in a 
transport that was not overcrowded. 
Evaluation of both our cases through the complex 
value network model, allowed highlighting the other 
actors inside the value network, and leads us to propose a 
different approach to value creation.  
It furthermore allows us to propose that generic value 
creation can be fostered in complex value networks. We 
transpose genericity as defined by Kokshagina (2014), 
meaning in this case the ability to simultaneously create 
value for several actors. As proposed by Kokshagina 
(2014) in the case of generic technologies, that should be 
adapted for several applications that are often still 
unknown, generic value creation should create value for 
several actors, some still unknown and sometimes not part 
of the value network. The network for a proposed 
innovation might not be the same as the ones found in the 
dominant design. All actors inside a network might not 
have been correctly identified, or new, unknown actors 
might be part of the new value network. Having products 
with generic value creation allows reducing risks of not 
creating value for all actors. From this perspective, the 
analysis of value creation is made possible in innovative 
complex value networks: the managerial challenge is to 
build a common core of value the most generic as 
possible. 
 
6.2 Redesigning the ecosystem 
Our second result is to describe how product design in 
complex value networks challenges the existing 
regulations and changes relations in the value network. In 
both companies the contracts and regulations in place do 
not allow the emergence of new business model 
propositions. We were able to identify that not only 
legislations applying to the operator are important, those 
linked to the authority are also essential. And shifts in the 
value network including new actors also demand a more 
comprehensive analysis of legislation. This allows 
understanding the impacts of these new actors and 
identifying weaknesses in legislation. But instead of only 
trying to exploit regulation voids, as has been done in the 
case of the e-cigarette (Etter et al., 2011), these elements 
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were used to re-open discussions on regulations in both 
our cases. 
Thus, the PTO was able to open negotiations on 
transport that would not be evaluated as public transport, 
but as a proximity service. This meant creating a new 
ecosystem, where the regulations of public transport did 
not apply. And in our second case the company worked 
on creating a space with other actors of the value chain to 
rethink certification. There was surely a space for creating 
non-certified objects, where non-aeronautical companies 
were already positioning themselves, and it represented an 
opportunity of value creation.  
Knowledge on what was valuable for the different 
stakeholders of the ecosystems also pushed both firms to 
establish new partnerships with other actors in the 
ecosystem. The companies were therefore both able to 
redesign their value network, and often to integrate new 
actors into the ecosystem. In both cases, the relationships 
in the new networks were also influenced. These networks 
focused on creating value for all its actors, and not only 
for the customer as is normally done in competitive 
situations and described on literature around value chains. 
The networks’ focus on value creation for all, demanded 
close collaboration between all actors in the value chain. 
6.3 Proposing a model of complex value 
network 
Building on the state of the art and the results from the 
cases, we could propose a more detailed model of 
complex value networks. Strongly regulated B2B 
ecosystems demand a new approach to value, since the 
final user’s, the firm’s customer’s and external regulators’ 
expectations and value evaluation frameworks have to be 
taken into account. Value evaluation of products in these 
cases is structuring in the relationship between actors, and 
the product itself is the base for he ecosystem and 
regulations in it. We propose in the table 4 below a 
specification of the notion of complex value networks. 
Table 4. Specifications of complex value networks. 
 Simple value 
network 
Complex value network 
Main actors - Unique 
Buyer/Final 
user 
- Unique 
Producer/Seller 
- Interdependent Final users 
- Multiple Buyers 
- Interdependent Producer/Seller  
- Prescribers 
Direct price-
cost link for 
users 
Yes No, products and services often 
partially or completely paid for / by 
other actors of the ecosystem 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Competitive 
(Optimization 
of value for 
customer) 
Collaborative (Optimization of the 
number of beneficiaries in the 
network) 
Collectives 
rules of 
coordination 
Firms processes 
to market 
launch 
Standards and regulations 
(infrastructure & certifications) 
Value 
creation 
analysis 
Business model 
and positioning 
in value chain 
In stable ecosystems: dominant 
design 
In emergent ecosystems or in case 
of innovation: Generic value model 
7. Managerial implications and discussion 
From an academic point of view, our findings and new 
model add to the theory on ecosystems dynamic. We 
show how value networks evolve inside ecosystems, as 
well as how ecosystems can be influenced by product 
design. 
Concerning managerial implications of these results, 
the first one is that when designing innovations in 
complex value networks, the value for several actors, not 
only the direct customer has to be evaluated. This means 
there is a need to change the design process to take 
several actors into account, including the business 
customer in B2B and the final user of the product, but in a 
joint investigation of value potentials, also open to other 
stakeholders. Although user integration into the design 
process has been the object of several studies and has 
been classified as extremely risky although rewarding 
(Enkel et al., 2005), taking the user into account does not 
necessarily mean user integration, especially in the new 
product development process of B2B industries. This 
conclusion was also reached concerning other 
stakeholders of the value at the ecosystem level. In the 
case of our empirical studies, it meant above all to change 
the company’s value evaluation and their approach to the 
“customers of value” within the ecosystem. A partnership 
between the two or more businesses integrating an 
ecosystem approach can emerge from this effort, and 
allow the creation of more adapted products and services. 
This is a very different managerial approach as the usual 
bargaining over value between stakeholders. 
Secondly, incumbent firms in complex value networks 
should actively seek to participate in radical innovations, 
since these can create new value networks. Participation 
in the network’s development is a first step to reduce 
chances of being excluded of it.  
The final implication of these results is the possibility 
for companies in complex value networks to act on both 
identified interaction levels with the ecosystem. Instead of 
undergoing regulation changes or trying to find regulatory 
voids, companies can use innovative product design to 
influence regulations. By changing their relationship to 
other actors in their value chain, they can propose or 
sustain innovative regulations that would take into 
account innovations that create value for the whole 
ecosystem. 
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